The Arakan Army’s Journey: From Rebels to Rulers and A New Arakan Paradigm
Executive Summary
1. The people and region of Arakan have a long history of political independence and anti- colonial struggles since 1785, when its last dynasty was overthrown. The Arakan Army (AA), founded by Twan Mrat Naing and a small group of Arakanese youths in April 2009, aims to establish an “Arakan Nation” through the “Way of Rakhita.”
2. The AA originated in Kachin state along the border with China, where political challenges in Arakan provided fertile ground for the group to expand in strength and size. Significant events contributing to this growth include the 2009 and 2015 Kokang wars, the breakdown of a 17-year ceasefire in Kachin state in 2011, and the 2012 communal violence in Rakhine state.
3. Before 2015, the AA was not a major player in the peace process under President U Thein Sein’s administration nor a dominant force in Arakan politics. However, its presence at the 2014 Arakan National Conference (ANC) and subsequent armed clashes in 2015 bolstered its popularity among the local population. The group was excluded as a signatory member from the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement.
4. The failure of the NLD leadership to accommodate the Arakan National Party (ANP), which had won the majority in Rakhine state elections, fueled support for armed struggle in Arakan. Escalating armed clashes since 2018, and the joint response by the NLD and Myanmar military, thrust the AA into the forefront of Arakan politics and as a critical actor in the nationwide peace process.
5. Following the 2021 military coup in Myanmar, the ULA leadership capitalized on the ensuing political turmoil to navigate among various divisive actors nationwide. The ULA supported several newly emerged anti-military coup resistance forces, particularly in the Sagaing, Magway regions, and Chin state bordering Arakan. By mid-2024, the ULA/AA emerged not only as the dominant military and political force in Arakan but also as a key player in Myanmar’s national politics.
Introduction
A: Background of Arakan
Arakan, known as Rakhine State, situated on the eastern bank of the Bay of Bengal and connected to other parts of Myanmar by the Arakan Roma Mountain range, is a region marked by profound political complexities and socio-economic issues. These complexities have been exacerbated by escalating communal violence since 2012, leading to armed confrontations, significant displacement, food insecurity, and disrupted livelihoods. Particularly notorious was its status since 2017 as a hotspot for the Rohingya crisis and the emergence of armed movements such as the United League of Arakan/Arakan Army (ULA/AA). Due to its strategic significance as a connecting hub for regional powers, the region has attracted substantial foreign investments from China and India.
The Rakhine people, also known as Arakanese, constitute one of Myanmar's prominent ethnic groups, with an estimated population of 3 to 4 million (3.22 million according to the Ministry of Immigration and Population of Myanmar in 2015. The region is ethnically diverse, encompassing groups such as the Arakanese, Rohingya, and other double minority communities, all facing unique challenges within Myanmar's complex socio- political landscape. Geographically, Rakhine State shares borders with Bangladesh and internally borders Chin State, as well as the regions of Magway, Bago, and Ayeyarwady. It covers an estimated area of 36,778 square kilometers and comprises 17 townships, with Sittwe serving as its capital city.
Despite its geographical advantages and cultural richness, the Arakan Region has a history of enduring prolonged and recurrent conflicts. Notably, the 2012 communal violence between Muslim and Buddhist communities in northern and central Rakhine State marked a significant turning point, followed by armed conflicts involving the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA) and the Myanmar military in 2016-17. The ongoing armed conflicts since 2018 between the Arakan Army (AA) and the Myanmar military, now known as the State Administration Council (SAC) regime, have further exacerbated regional development and peace. Amidst these conflicts, the resurgence of Rakhine nationalism, rooted in the historical grievances dating back to the fall of the independent Kingdom of Arakan to Bamar King Bodawpaya of the Konbaung Dynasty on December 31, 1784, underscores a profound longing for the region's former independence.
B: Background of Arakan Army (AA)
The Arakan Army (AA) was founded by Twan Mrat Naing and 25 comrades in April 2009 along the Myanmar-China border in Kachin State, with support from the Kachin Independence Army (KIA). The political objective is to establish an “Arakan Nation” through the “Way of Rakhita,” an ideology that embodies the struggle for national liberation and the restoration of sovereignty to the people of Arakan. The Arakan Army (AA) began its conflict with the military in northern Rakhine State in 2015. An escalation of hostilities by the AA started in late 2018 and continued until the first week of November 2020, just three months before the military coup. Major-General Twan Mrat Naing, the leader of the AA, has expressed a desire for “confederation status” for Arakan, similar to the status enjoyed by the United Wa State Army. Indeed, the power dynamics in Rakhine State have been significantly reshaped by the AA and its political wing, the United League of Arakan (ULA), over the past decade. After serious military confrontations with the Myanmar military from 2015 to 2020, it led to an informal ceasefire in November 2020, allowing the AA to consolidate power by establishing and expanding its parallel administration. Although tensions resurfaced in late 2021 and conflict resumed in 2022, another fragile ceasefire was established in November 2022.
Despite being labeled a terrorist organization by the Tatmadaw and the NLD-led government, the AA's status shifted after the military coup in February 2021, with both the junta and the Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw (CRPH) retracting the terrorist label. However, the AA has maintained its support for anti-junta forces. The growth of the AA can be attributed to four main factors. Firstly, the AA's young, educated leadership, including Maj. Gen. Twan Mrat Naing and Brig. Gen. Nyo Twan Awng, has effectively expanded the organization. The second factor is its strategic political mobilization through initiatives like the "Arakan Dream 2020," which has consistently galvanized support and aimed for greater autonomy. Thirdly, the greater support of Rakhine people for the AA has been driven by constrained political space and government actions. Lastly, AA’s strategic alliance-building with other ethnic armed groups, particularly along the Myanmar-China border, has provided a crucial resource base enabling the AA to maintain and expand its activities and formulate its goals.
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The CAS is an independent, non-partisan and research-oriented group conducting research and analyzing issues related to Arakan/Rakhine affairs.
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